

## Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 054345

NODIS

FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM USUN NEW YORK  
MARCH 10:

QUOTE S E C R E T USUN 0703

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

FROM ANDREW YOUNG

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, WA

SUBJECT: STRATEGY ON NAMIBIA

REF: A) USUN 691; B) USUN 692

1. IT HAS BECOME QUITE CLEAR TO ME OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS  
THAT WE ARE HEADING FOR A VERY MAJOR CONFRONTATION BOTH  
AT THE UN AND IN OUR RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

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OVER NAMIBIA, WHICH, UNLIKE SOUTH AFRICA OR EVEN RHODESIA,  
IS A CLEAR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. WHETHER THE  
CONFRONTATION OCCURS AT THE END OF THIS MONTH-WITHIN A  
WEEK OR TWO AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT THE UN--OR  
LATER THIS SPRING, IT IS BOUND TO OCCUR GIVEN OUR INABILITY TO  
CONVINCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO MOVE IN THE  
DIRECTION OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE

NAMIBIA QUESTION.

2. IF FULL RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE FOR THE PAST MONTH BEEN TRYING TO GAIN SOUTH AFRICA'S RECONFIRMATION OF THE SEVEN POINTS THEY AFFIRMED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER LAST YEAR. SOUTH AFRICA HAS REFUSED TO RECONFIRM THEM BUT SEEMS TO SUGGEST MODIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE MORE OBJECTIONABLE A PROPOSAL ALREADY REJECTED BY SWAPO. SOUTH AFRICA APPEARS TO BE PLAYING FOR TIME AND IN ANY EVENT SHOWS NO INCLINATION TO DEVIATE FROM THE COURSE THEY HAVE EMBARKED UPON TO ESTABLISH, AS EARLY AS JUNE, AN INTERIM TURNHALLE GOVERNMENT BASED UPON ETHNIC RATHER THAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS--IN SHORT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANT A NAMIBIA WITH VETO POWER FOR NAMIBIAN WHITES AND SUBJECT TO CONTINUING SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROL.

3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THIS EVER BE ACCEPTED INTERNATIONALLY AND I CANNOT IMAGINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE US WOULD ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH SUCH A RESULT.

4. ACCORDINGLY, OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE A STRATEGY WHICH MIGHT CONVINCE, CAJOLE OR COERCE SOUTH AFRICA INTO ANOTHER COURSE OF ACTION. IT IS WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, TOGETHER WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS AT THE LAST NSC MEETING, THAT I ADVANCED THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO TO THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (THE UK, FRANCE, THE FRG AND CANADA) AND, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, WITH  
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THE SWAPO REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK:

--WE SHOULD PRESS FOR A SOLEMN DECLARATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MONTH ON SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WOULD AFFIRM THE OVERRIDING COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO RACIAL EQUALITY, MAJORITY RULE, AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. SUCH A DECLARATION, MADE WHILE THE US IS PRESIDENT OF THE SC, WOULD SERVE A BENCHMARK AND REFERENCE POINT FOR FUTURE NATIONAL AND UN ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. PUBLICLY, THE IDEA WOULD DOVETAIL WITH THE DIRECTION OF US POLICY WHICH THE PRESIDENT WILL DESCRIBE IN HIS SPEECH NEXT WEEK.

--WE SHOULD ALSO BRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DESIGNATE ITS FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS AS A COMMISSION TO WORK WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND SEPARATELY WITH SWAPO AND OTHER POLITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 385.

5. IN ADVANCING THESE IDEAS, WHICH WERE WARMLY GREETED BY THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE SC, I HAD IN MIND A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. RESOLUTION 385 ESTABLISHES A UNANIMOUSLY AGREED UPON MODERATE FRAMEWORK FOR SETTLING THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM. IT CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND FREE ELECTIONS. I DOUBT IF WE WILL EVER AGAIN BE ABLE TO GET SUCH A MODERATE AND WESTERN-ORIENTED EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. CONSEQUENTLY WE SHOULD NOT LET IT SLIP--AS IT IS SLIPPING--BUT SHOULD INSIST UPON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IN ADDITION, THE US HAS BEEN CARRYING THE SOLE BURDEN FOR THE WEST IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A NAMIBIA SOLUTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE OUR INTERESTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THAT UNIQUE ROLE. WE SHOULD SHARE THAT ROLE WITH OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. A SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION BASED ON RESOLUTION 385 PROVIDES FOR THAT SHARING.

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6. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT IN MEETING WITH THE NIGERIAN PERM REP TODAY, I SUGGESTED THAT THE AFRICANS MOVE AWAY FROM THE SHORT-SIGHTED PASSAGE OF RESOLUTIONS FOR RESOLUTIONS' SAKE AND SEEK TO WORK WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON A LONG-TERM AND REALISTIC STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA. HIS RESPONSE WAS POSITIVE BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT THAT HAD BEEN THE AFRICAN APPROACH WHEN THEY COOPERATED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN UNANIMOUS PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION 385, ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD EMBARKED ON ANOTHER APPROACH IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

7. I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK, HOWEVER, IF I DID NOT ADVISE YOU THAT THE SCENARIO I HAVE DESCRIBED LACKS ONE KEY INGREDIENT: A DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A CHAPTER VII FINDING ON NAMIBIA SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA FAIL TO AGREE TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM WITH THE FRAMEWORK OF 385. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AND ON THE PART OF THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I STRONGLY DOUBT THAT THE OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WILL AGREE EITHER TO A DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA OR TO THE KIND OF FIVE POWER APPROACH I HAVE SUGGESTED. MOREOVER, THE THREAT OF A CHAPTER VII FINDING, WITH THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS THAT CAN IN TIME FOLLOW, IS THE ONE WAY OF PUTTING TEETH INTO A WESTERN PRESENTATION TO SOUTH AFRICA AND OF PROVIDING SOUTH AFRICA WITH A CLEAR CHANCE OF RECOVERING AND REDIRECTING ITS POLICY IN NAMIBIA.

8. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE GRAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT

MOVING TOWARDS CHAPTER VII AND THAT PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN  
WILL BE MENTIONING THESE CONCERNS TO YOU WHEN YOU MEET  
WITH HIM. I DO NOT WANT TO MINIMIZE BRITISH CONCERNS, AND  
PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THEIR INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH  
AFRICA. BUT THE MEDIUM AND LONGER TERM SECURITY OF  
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BRITISH INVESTMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL DEPEND UPON A  
PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE AND SOME MEASURE OF  
RACIAL JUSTICE. THE WORST MISTAKE THE BRITISH CAN MAKE  
WOULD BE TO TIE THEMSELVES TO THE PATTERN AND PACE OF  
SOUTHER AFRICAN POLICY. DOING SO MAY CAUSE US TO PASS UP  
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPROMISE AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS,  
LEAVE US AND THE BRITISH IN A SITUATION SIMILAR TO THOSE  
OF THE CONGO, ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE. WE WILL HAVE PLAYED  
FOR TIME AND LOST ALL --INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC AND  
POLITICAL ADVANTAGES WE SOUGHT TO PROTECT. MOREOVER,  
THE BRITISH KNOW THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT AUTO-  
MATICALLY FOLLOW A CHAPTER VII FINDING AND THAT IN THIS  
INITIAL PHASE WHAT IS PROPOSED IS TO MAKE MANDATORY OUR CURRENT  
VOLUNTARY ARMS EMBARGO. WE RETAIN FOR OURSELVES, AS  
WE DID FOR TEN YEARS ON RHODESIA, THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHAT,  
IF ANY, ADDITIONAL MEASURES WE COULD SUPPORT. WE CAN MAKE  
THIS POINT WITH THE AFRICANS. I HOPE THAT THE PRIME  
MINISTER WILL UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE  
FEW OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST NOW TO ALTER THE COURSE OF  
EVENTS IN NAMIBIA. AS TO THE FRG AND CANADA, FROM MY  
CONVERSATIONS I AM CONVINCED THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW A U.S.  
LEAD ON CHAPTER VII IF IT IS TIED TO A BROADER STRATEGY.  
BUT ONLY OUR ACTION WILL PULL FRANCE AND U.K. ALONG. YOUNG  
UNQU

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